Abstract Past research demonstrates that economic expectations of mass publics are related to political and policy outcomes. However, these studies often assume the public possesses the same information levels and capabilities, and some inappropriately equate a prospective orientation with the ability to make unbiased forecasts. In this article we relax the information-homogeneity assumption and use education level as a proxy for heterogeneity. These heterogeneous education (information) levels are used in a test for unbiased forecasting (i.e., weak rational expectations) in inflation expectations data from the Institute of Social Research's Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. The period of analysis is January 1978 to December 1993. Our descriptive evidence indicates that the members of better-educated strata are more accurate in predicting future movements in actual inflation. The more rigorous tests show that only the most educated exhibit any evidence of weak rational expectations. This suggests that the often contradictory results of past studies may be partly attributable to the information homogeneity assumption. On a broader level, the findings reflect the mass public's varying abilities to hold elected officials accountable. 
normative issue of democratic accountability more directly than with a finding for a prospective-voter orientation.
To resolve these issues, actual inflation-forecast data are broken down by formal educational attainment. We hypothesize that more educated segments of citizens more accurately forecast actual inflation than do their less educated counterparts. In other words, we expect that the condition of WRE most likely occurs in the well-educated segments of the electorate. We test for WRE using Survey of Consumer Attitudes data on monthly inflation expectations between January 1978 and December 1993.
Weak Rational Expectations: Theory and Hypotheses
Weak rational expectations pertain to an individual's ability to predict correctly on average (see, e.g., Brown and Maital 1981; Muth 1961; Sheffrin 1983 ). This is less demanding of an individual's or group's information-processing ability than is strong rational expectations (SRE), which require the efficient use of all current and available information.3 While WRE posit that segments of the electorate are able to predict the future in a manner in which mistakes are not systematically made, it by no means implies perfect prediction.
Theoretically, WRE can be represented by the following expression:
where the prediction for X at time t + i (Xte+) equals the expected value of X at time t + i, conditional on a subset (cot) of all relevant information contained in the information set (L2,) at time t. Intuitively, this means that the predictions of X (Xe+ ) on average equal its realizations i periods ahead (Xt+i). This property, known as unbiased forecasting, implies the following empirical result:
The theoretical mean of the forecast errors [E(4t+,)] is zero when only using a single expectation variable (Xte+i) to predict the actual value of Xt+i. WRE imply that a given segment of the electorate constructs accurate forecasts on average, even though they fail to consider other relevant information that aids in forecasting X at time t + i.4
3. SRE are efficient since no other available information can be used to improve a forecast. We explore this issue in another paper (Krause and Granato 1996) . 4. The result that expectational errors are zero forecloses the chance of alternative forms of testing. It could be argued that another test could be correctly predicting the direction of change in a variable. However, this test fails since the possibility exists where the prediction is in the same direction, yet the forecaster will never actually catch up to the actual values. Systematic prediction error can still occur.
In the context of information heterogeneity, forecasts should not be uniform. As the most highly interested individuals are also the best informed and quickest to process political (or economic) information (Graber 1984; MacKuen 1984), we expect the inflation forecasts of the more educated stratum to exhibit less bias than the forecasts of the less educated strata.
Inflation Expectations: Accountability and Feasibility Constraints
Inflation expectations serve as an important indicator of electorate sophistication at two levels. First, macroeconomic models centered on the RE hypothesis maintain that, although the public's expectations may misdiagnose long-term policy consequences, they cannot be permanently inaccurate. Note the difference between RE and prospectiveness. A prospective orientation can be permanently inaccurate. 5 An example of this difference can be shown by way of macroeconomic policy initiatives. Consider a policy change that is made to raise aggregate demand (price inflation) and lower unemployment-a short-term Phillips curve trade-off. This policy succeeds if it does not cause the public's longterm inflation expectations to rise. If inflation expectations increase as an accurate reflection of the policy's future consequences, then wage demands soon reflect the higher inflation expectations. This eventually negates the stimulative policy, since the increasing wage demands make labor costs prohibitively high and discourage additional hiring. In the end, the purpose of the policy is defeated since both unemployment and inflation increase to levels that are higher than they were before the policy changes. Under WRE, in contrast, the ability of the public to upgrade their inflation expectations (via wage demands) is faster and more accurate than if they merely possess a prospective orientation. What is the basis for heterogeneous information levels? Quite simply, the acquisition of information is not a costless endeavor. Research findings suggest that more informed members of the electorate have greater ability to acquire information than do less informed segments (Graber 1984; MacKuen 1984).7 The most knowledgeable group of individuals on 6. Moreover, this measure yields a more detailed time series on economic expectations because it asks survey respondents for an actual prediction value (rather than an ordinal response). 7. MacKuen (1984, pp. 386-87) finds that (1) citizens' reaction time to changes in media coverage are shaped by skill and motivations associated with information processing and that (2) citizens differ in the speed with which they respond to changes in the elite political a given subject not only acquires the most information, but are also able to retain more of it than are less knowledgeable segments (Ferejohn 1990, p. 11). In contrast, those segments of the electorate with lower levels of political sophistication often use heuristic devices (i.e., judgmental shortcuts) as a way of becoming more informed (Lupia 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). The upshot is that while aggregate analysis is a fruitful endeavor, it is important to investigate information heterogeneity within the electorate (Converse 1990).
We use formal educational attainment to serve as a proxy for information levels. Some political scientists argue that the information distinction between groups or strata falls along the lines of formal educational attainment because it is strongly related to the ability to behave as a sophisticated actor (e. This variable is superior to other surveyed "expectation variables"-environment. In addition, it is possible that more informed portions of the electorate acquire higher quality information. We thank John Freeman for bringing this latter point to our attention. Since education serves as our proxy for heterogeneous information levels, we categorize the inflation-expectation series into the following educational groupings: those respondents with less than a high school diploma or its equivalent (LOW), those who have a high school diploma and those with some college or postsecondary education (MEDIUM), and those respondents who have at least a baccalaureate four-year college degree (HIGH)." As a further check on the heterogeneity question, we include a category for all respondents in the sample (AGGREGATE). Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis of the respective inflation expectations of the three groups.'2 Each group exhibits a similar pattern in that they all start off in the late 1970s as having "peaks" in expectations. These expectations fall in the 1980s, just as actual inflation was falling. The least-educated group (LOW) is more volatile than the other two groups, with the least-volatile group being the highest-educated group (HIGH). The expected negative relationship between education and volatility is borne out by the respective range (minimum to maximum) of predictions for LOW (4.81-19.5), MEDIUM (4.6-14.18), and HIGH (3.81-13.6). The breakdown by education also holds for the forecast errors. The standard deviation follows a similar pattern (LOW = 3.68, MEDIUM = 3.50, HIGH = 3.45).
10. Freeman (1990) argues that researchers should work with data in the sampling interval that most closely matches its natural time interval. Failure to do so leads to results that are contaminated by systematic sampling and temporal aggregation. We employ monthly rather than the temporally aggregated quarterly measures used elsewhere (Clarke and Stewart 1994; Haller and Norpoth 1994; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). This is sensible given that many macroeconomic statistics (including the rate of inflation) are released to the public in monthly intervals. 11. The original data from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes has six educational categories that are ordinal. Although we conduct the entire analysis with these six categories and have similar outcomes, these "uncollapsed" results have much smaller sample sizes for the six individual categories. This induces volatility in the data that is distinct from behavioral patterns we wish to capture. It is apparent from the mean forecast errors for each group that all strata, on average, overpredict the actual inflation rate. However, the more educated segments of the electorate possess both a smaller mean forecast error and variance. In addition, the mean absolute forecast error and root mean square error are smaller as we move to higher education levels 
where it+12 iS the actual inflation rate twelve months ahead and it is the Survey of Consumer Attitudes forecast for each educational stratum. 14 The WRE hypothesis is supported if cj-0 and , 3` = 1 jointly cannot be rejected (Sheffrin 1983, p. 18) .15 Note that these tests of voter rationality are subject to an overlapping data problem (Hansen and Hodrick 1980) . This statistical dilemma refers to a moving average process in the forecast errors that is induced by the measurement intervals of the data set (monthly data) being smaller than the 12-month forecasting horizon used to predict future inflation (Brown 13. Theil's UM bias coefficient is a measure of systematic error that captures the average values of actual and predicted (forecasted) series deviate from one another (Theil 1966, pp. 26-36) . See the bottom of table 1 for formulas. 14. While all data have some measurement error, this could especially be true for the surveyed inflation forecast. Since it serves as an independent variable, this introduces the possibility that the error term and this variable are correlated, thereby violating a central assumption of the classical linear model. We test for this possibility by using the Ramsey (1969) RESET. The null hypothesis is that the residuals have a zero mean vector. In all four cases, the null cannot be rejected. 15. This same type of test has been applied by students of international financial economics to determine whether currency exchange markets are efficient (e.g., Baillie, Lippens, and In table 2, the Wald (X2) tests for the joint hypothesis test that a;j = 0 and f3* = 1 is rejected for the two lowest-educated groups (LOW and MEDIUM) as well as for the electorate as an aggregate, homogeneous entity (AGGREGATE).16 Interestingly, we do find some evidence WRE can be rejected for all educational groups if the significance-level threshold is at the 10-percent level. However, using the 5-percent convention, we do find that the most educated segments of the electorate (HIGH) possess WRE. In summary, our findings do uncover some notable empirical evidence that the electorate is a heterogeneous entity with different levels of sophistication in forecasting inflation, based on differences in educational attainment. Both the descriptive statistics of the forecast errors and univariate forecasting statistics show strong support for our thesis that more educated segments of the electorate form more accurate inflation forecasts than do their less educated counterparts. Moreover, while the aggregate electorate as a single entity closely resembles the sophistication displayed by the middle educated group, it neglects the variability from those with less than a high school education and those with at least a four-year college degree. Based on the regression-based hypothesis tests for weak rationality, there is only modest support for the information heterogeneity thesis. It is also important, however, to consider that the magnitude of this test statistic declines by an appreciable amount as we move from the least educated (LOW) through the most educated (HIGH) strata. The overall portrait suggests that the degree of inflation-forecast unbiasedness generally declines as we move from less informed (educated) toward more informed (educated) segments of the electorate.
16. We use two alternatives to test for equality between these regression models. One way to do this is to test the equality for the dual hypotheses that (Xj = 0 and Pj* = 1 across educational segments by stacking the individual equations into a system of equations. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the constants (OxLOW = 0aMEDIUM = oHIGH) and slopes (PLOW = PMEDIUM = PHIGH), respectively, are equal to each other across each group. The joint hypothesis, however, that assumes that both constants and slopes are equal across each of the three equations (QxLOW = aMEDIUM = 0HIGH, = PLOW PMEDIUM = PHIGH) is rejected at the 1-percent level. An additional way to test for equality is the likelihood-ratio test. This test is pairwise where: -2 X (log-likelihood, -log-likelihood2) _ X2). The null hypothesis is that there are no differences in terms of predictive power. The findings show that the more educated segments of the mass public do form more accurate forecasts of inflation. In addition, there is moderate evidence that the most-educated segment of the electorate (those with at least a baccalaureate college degree) form inflation forecasts that are not systematically incorrect. Their predictions of inflation, on average, equal their realizations. That is, they form unbiased forecasts of actual inflation one year into the future.
These same results, however, also show that those citizens with some college training or less education fail to exhibit WRE. This points to a weakness of previous work that relies on the information-homogeneity assumption. While the aggregate homogeneous (AGGREGATE) results are strikingly similar to those from moderately educated stratum (MEDIUM), these results will misstate the sophistication of the least-and most-educated segments of the citizenry (see, e.g., Curtin 1980; Gramlich 1983).
The implications of this research for democratic accountability are clear in that our variable of interest can serve as a feasibility constraint on policy makers. Although a feasibility constraint does exist regarding inflation expectations, it is both variable and limited in scope. The reason is this: while the most-educated portion of the mass public cannot be systematically "fooled" by incumbent policy makers with respect to inflation, the less educated segments appear to have significant trouble in correctly gauging movements. The fact that the bulk of the public fails the test for WRE raises challenging questions for democratic accountability. However, this does not preclude the possibility that better-educated segments of the electorate, through a variety of communication channels, might "lead" the less informed segments to behave in a manner consistent with WRE (Granato and Krause 1998; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, p. 607; Mishkin 1983, pp. 59-60; Townsend 1983).
These findings point future research in two directions. The first direc-tion is that heterogeneity should be the general rule of thumb when modeling political (or economic) information levels. Models should be augmented to include this complication with new predictions forthcoming. The second area of investigation is determining, in as direct a manner as possible, how quickly and accurately information is transmitted to and incorporated by a heterogeneously informed public.
